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Peter L. Cooch* 
California ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc.: 
Mismanaging the Intersection of Antitrust and 
Labor Law 
Introduction 
In California ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc.,1 the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, considered whether the nonstatutory 
labor exemption insulated a multiemployer bargaining unit’s temporary revenue 
sharing provision from antitrust scrutiny, and if not, which Sherman Act § 1 
standard of review applied.2 The court held that summary condemnation, whether 
as a per se violation or on a “quick look” analysis, was improper because the rule of 
reason standard of review governed the inquiry.3 By continuing the federal courts’ 
preference for avoiding false positives over formalistic line drawing, the court 
properly linked antitrust challenges of intricate collective bargaining arrangements 
to the rule of reason.4 Applying the rule of reason standard allows courts to 
sufficiently analyze the complex economics of temporary revenue sharing 
provisions and avoid condemnation of beneficial business practices.5 
Despite its liberal application of the rule of reason standard, the court 
inappropriately declined to broaden the scope of antitrust law’s nonstatutory labor 
exemption.6 As a result of the court’s narrow interpretation, multiemployer 
bargaining units face unnecessary antitrust liability exposure when using revenue 
sharing provisions during collective bargaining.7 Thus, the Ninth Circuit created an 
imbalance of bargaining power between employer and union, increasing the costs 
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 1. 651 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 2. Id. at 1122. 
 3. Id. at 1134, 1137. 
 4. See infra Part IV.A  
 5. See infra Part IV.A. 
 6. See infra Part IV.B. 
 7. See infra Part IV.B.  
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of labor negotiations and undermining fair collective bargaining.8 Alternatively, 
applying the nonstatutory labor exemption to temporary revenue sharing 
provisions would further antitrust and labor policy by avoiding false positives, 
reducing litigation costs, and encouraging mutually beneficial negotiations.9 
I. The Case 
A. Factual Background 
With their current collective bargaining agreement expiring in October of 2003, 
three of Southern California’s largest supermarket chains, Ralphs, Albertson’s and 
Vons, formed a multiemployer collective bargaining unit (MEBU)10 to negotiate a 
new labor contract (CBA) with the United Food and Commercial Workers labor 
organization (UCFW).11 A month before the old labor contract expired, the grocers 
executed two Mutual Strike Assistant Agreements (collectively the “Agreement”)12 
to prepare for the upcoming negotiations.13 The employers, in anticipation of union 
whipsaw tactics,14 agreed to abide by a revenue sharing provision (RSP) and lock 
out all union employees within forty-eight hours of a strike.15 In addition, the RSP 
included Food 4 Less, a supermarket not privy to the disputed contract.16 Food 4 
Less agreed to the RSP because its own labor agreement would expire in the near 
 
 8. See infra Part IV.B. 
 9. See infra Part IV.B. 
 10. Multiemployer bargaining units form when several employers in one industry join together to 
collectively negotiate with a union. Comment, Employer Withdrawal from Multiemployer Bargaining Units: A 
Proposal for Self-Regulation, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 689, 689 (1982). Typically, both employers and unions favor the 
use of multiemployer bargaining units to facilitate efficient negotiations. Id. Once the National Labor Relations 
Board, a federal regulatory agency, certifies a multiemployer bargaining unit with each party’s consent, 
employer and union can begin negotiations. Id. at 690. 
 11. Cal. ex rel. Lockyer v. Safeway, Inc., 371 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1182 (C.D. Cal. 2005), aff’d in part and rev’d 
in part by Cal. ex rel. Brown v. Safeway, Inc., 615 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2010), aff’d in part and rev’d in part by Cal. 
ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc., 615 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc). As one of the nation’s largest labor 
unions, the UFCW represents over 1.3 million workers in retail food and clothing industries, meatpacking, 
poultry and other food processing industries, and health care, garment, chemical and distillery industries. Brief 
of Amici Curiae United Food and Commercial Workers International Union 1, Cal. ex rel. Brown v. Safeway, 
Inc., 615 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2011) (Filed No. 08-55671, No. 08-55708), 2009 WL 2824441, at *1.  
 12. The two agreements were identical in substance, except each applied to a different labor organization. 
Lockyer, 371 F. Supp. 2d at 1182 & n.1. 
 13. Id. at 1182. 
 14. Whipsaw tactics are stratagems designed to act as economic weapons by exerting pressure on one 
employer within a multiemployer bargaining unit. In California ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc., the union 
employed selective strikes and picketing during the lockout. 651 F.3d 1118, 1140 (9th Cir. 2011) (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting) (citing Int’l Bhd. of Boilermakers v. NLRB, 858 F.2d 756, 760 (D.C. Cir. 1988)).  
 15. Lockyer, 371 F. Supp. 2d at 1182. 
 16. Id. 
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future.17 With negotiations upcoming, Food 4 Less had a strong interest in the 
current dispute’s outcome.18 
By agreeing to the RSP, the individual grocers were hedged against lost revenues 
from any targeted whipsaw tactic; if the union picketed a particular grocer, reducing 
that grocer’s revenues, the harmed party would have received compensation from 
the other benefiting grocers.19 The RSP employed a fixed formula of limited 
duration to calculate shared revenues.20 Essentially, the agreement required any 
member earning revenues above its historical market share to reimburse fifteen 
percent of excess revenues to the whipsaw victims.21 The RSP applied to revenues 
accrued from the week in which the strike commenced until two full weeks 
following the end of the strike.22 
On October 11, 2003, negotiations broke down and the UCFW went on strike, 
picketing select supermarkets.23 The impasse lasted over four months, ending in 
February 2004.24 As required by the RSP, Ralphs and Food 4 Less paid the other 
supermarkets approximately $142 million in excess revenue acquired during the 
strike period and another $4.2 million for the two-week period following the 
strike.25 
B. Procedural History 
On February 2, 2004, the State of California filed a complaint alleging that the 
MEBU members violated U.S. antitrust law, specifically Sherman Act § 1, by 
engaging in an unlawful combination and conspiracy in restraint of interstate trade 
and commerce.26 The grocers moved for summary judgment on the ground that the 
RSP was immune from antitrust scrutiny under the nonstatutory labor exemption.27 
The district court denied the motion, holding that the RSP was beyond the scope of 
the nonstatutory labor exemption.28 In addition, the district court denied 
California’s motion for summary judgment in which California argued that the RSP 
 
 17. Harris, 651 F.3d at 1142. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Lockyer, 371 F. Supp. 2d at 1182. 
 20. Id. (“[B]eginning at ‘12:01 a.m. on the Monday at the start of the week in which the strike or 
lockout . . . commences and continuing for two . . . full weeks following the week in which each strike or 
lockout ends.’”). 
 21. Id. at 1197. 
 22. Id. at 1182. 
 23. Id.  
 24. Id.  
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 1181. California sought a permanent injunction and attorney’s fees. Cal. ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, 
Inc., 651 F.3d 1118, 1124 n.5 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 27. Harris, 651 F.3d at 1124. 
 28. Id. 
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was a per se violation of § 1 or, alternatively, that it was unlawful under the “quick 
look” analysis.29 
While preserving the right to appeal, the parties stipulated to the entry of final 
judgment for the grocers after California agreed not to pursue liability for a 
violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act under a full rule of reason analysis, and the 
defendants agreed not to pursue various affirmative defenses except the 
nonstatutory labor exemption.30 In accordance with the parties’ stipulations, the 
district court entered judgment in favor of the grocers.31 
California appealed, arguing that the RSP was per se unlawful under § 1 or, 
alternatively, under “quick look” analysis.32 In addition, the MEBU cross-appealed, 
arguing that the nonstatutory labor exemption applied.33 On appeal, the Ninth 
Circuit held that the RSP violated the Sherman Act under a “quick look” analysis 
and the defendants’ actions were not exempt under the nonstatutory labor 
exemption.34 Pursuant to Circuit Rule 35-3, a majority of the judges voted to rehear 
the case en banc.35 
II. Legal Background 
By the late nineteenth century, the Industrial Revolution had brought about 
significant social and economic changes to the United States.36 Cooperation and 
aggregation among large firms threatened to hinder robust economic competition.37 
Thus, in 1890, Congress passed the Sherman Antitrust Act (Sherman Act) to 
 
 29. The defendants renewed their motion for summary judgment on the nonstatutory labor exemption, 
which was denied a second time. Id. 
 30. Id. Although unclear in the opinion, the State of California was most likely unwilling to pursue the case 
under the rule of reason standard due to the extensive resources necessary to fully litigate a case under this 
standard. See Jennifer E. Gladieux, Towards a Single Standard for Antitrust: The Federal Trade Commission’s 
Evolving Rule of Reason, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 471, 471–72 (1997) (“[A]pplying [the rule of reason] can be 
difficult because significant judicial costs are entailed in undertaking a complete factual inquiry, including the 
costs of gathering evidence on varied industries, performing a market analysis, and interpreting business 
rationales.”); Steven C. Salop & Lawrence J. White, Economic Analysis of Private Antitrust Litigation, 74 GEO. L.J. 
1001 (1986) (examining the effect of increased litigation expenses and declining government enforcement on 
private antitrust litigation). 
 31. Harris, 651 F.3d at 1124. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Cal. ex rel. Brown v. Safeway, Inc., 615 F.3d 1171, 1202 (9th Cir. 2010), aff’d in part and rev’d in part by 
Cal. ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc., 615 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
 35. Cal. ex rel. Brown v. Safeway, Inc., 633 F.3d 1210, 1211 (9th Cir. 2011).   
 36. See Myron W. Watkins, The Sherman Act: Its Designs and Its Effects, 43 Q. J. ECON. 1, 1–3 (1928) (“[T]o 
realize that the last generation was the first to learn to look upon affairs from this national viewpoint 
habitually . . . but reflected the change in the scope of economic intercourse from local and sectional markets to 
national markets . . . By the Act of July 2, 1890, called the Sherman Act, Congress for the first time exerted its 
paramount authority so as to make every species of business conducted in the national sphere subject to a 
common rule. The subject matter of that common rule was the method of organizing trade and industry.”). 
 37. Id. 
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combat the harmful effects of excessive industrial concentration and promote 
competition.38 Sherman Act § 1 prohibits “[e]very contract, combination . . . or 
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States . . . .”39 Since 
the language of § 1 is largely ambiguous, judicial interpretation has guided the law’s 
development.40 Over the past century, federal courts have developed three different 
methods for scrutinizing business practices challenged under Sherman Act § 1.41 An 
antitrust court will apply a different standard of review depending on the 
challenged practice’s nature.42 To facilitate healthy labor relations, however, 
Congress and the Supreme Court have insulated certain aspects of collective 
bargaining from antitrust scrutiny.43 
A. The Analytical Framework for Resolving Sherman Act § 1 Disputes 
Read strictly, courts could interpret § 1 to ban literally every contract, combination, 
or conspiracy in restraint of trade.44 To some degree every contract or business 
combination creates cooperation between potential rivals.45 However, many of these 
business arrangements enhance competition.46 Efficient commodities trading, for 
example, would not be possible without comprehensive rules regulating traders.47 
These procompetitive practices operate to increase output and reduce price, 
improving economic conditions for consumers.48 The goal of antitrust law, 
therefore, has not been to eliminate all business associations, but “to perfect the 
operation of competitive markets.”49 
 
 38. Id.  
 39. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
 40. See Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 899 (2007) (“From the 
beginning the Court has treated the Sherman Act as a common-law statute.”); Nat’l Soc. of Prof’l Eng’rs v. 
United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978) (noting that the Sherman Act’s legislative history makes it clear that the 
courts have a broad mandate to shape the law by relying on the common-law tradition); Northwest Airlines, 
Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U.S. 77, 98 n.42 (1981) (noting that “[i]n antitrust, the federal courts enjoy 
more flexibility and act more as common-law courts than in other areas governed by federal statute”). 
 41. WILLIAM HOLMES & MELISSA MANGIARACINA, ANTITRUST LAW HANDBOOK, §§ 2:9, 10 (2012).  
 42. Federal courts have struggled to find the appropriate boundaries for these standards. See infra Parts 
II.A.1–3. 
 43. See infra Part II.B. 
 44. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 98 (1984) (noting 
that the NCAA’s television contract constitutes a “restraint of trade” because it limits members’ freedom to 
negotiate, but stressing that every contract, in some sense, is a restraint of trade). 
 45. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 1 (1984). 
 46. Id. 
 47. See id. (noting that the Chicago Board of Trade has “a sheaf of rules and cooperative arrangements that 
reduce the cost of competition”). 
 48. See, e.g., Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 468 U.S. at 113 (noting that as Broadcast Music, Inc. v. 
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979), indicates, a joint selling arrangement may “mak[e] 
possible a new product by reaping otherwise unattainable efficiencies” (quoting Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. 
Med. Soc’y, 467 U.S. 332, 365 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted))). 
 49. Easterbrook, supra note 45, at 1. 
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Through the Sherman Act, Congress intended to protect consumers from 
anticompetitive business practices that suppress competition and reduce economic 
wealth.50 Since some arrangements are procompetitive, the Supreme Court has held 
that the Sherman Act only condemns unreasonable restraints of trade.51 By 
eliminating only unreasonable restraints, the Court encourages the efficient 
allocation of resources such that “consumers are assured competitive price and 
quality.”52 Given the complexities of modern markets, courts are hard pressed to 
effectuate this policy and find the appropriate balance between competition and 
cooperation.53 
Antitrust judges face two potential errors during the decision-making process.54 
A false positive occurs when the judge mistakenly condemns a procompetitive 
practice.55 Conversely, a false negative manifests when a judge errantly permits a 
competition-harming business practice.56 The Supreme Court and commentators 
have noted that false positives are particularly concerning because the practice’s 
benefits may be lost forever.57 Stare decisis discourages firms from engaging in the 
condemned practice for fear of antitrust liability.58 False negatives, by contrast, are 
self-correcting in the long run.59 Anticompetitive practices attract new market entry 
because prices and output are not at equilibrium levels.60 To address these concerns 
and assess antitrust challenges efficiently, courts have developed three different 
standards of review: the per se rule, the rule of reason, and the “quick look” or 




 50. See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (“Congress designed the Sherman Act as a 
‘consumer welfare prescription.’” (quoting R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 66 (1978))). 
 51. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911). 
 52. Rebel Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1433 (9th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). 
 53. See Easterbrook, supra note 45, at 2 (noting that courts cannot confidently determine an antitrust suit 
unless it knows the ‘right’ balance between competition and cooperation). 
 54. See id. (examining the harm from condemning procompetitive restraints and permitting 
anticompetitive practices). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id.  
 57. See Chris Bernard, Shifting and Shrinking Common Ground: Recalibrating the Federal Trade 
Commission’s and Department of Justice’s Enforcement Powers of Single-Firm Monopoly Conduct, 34 DEL. J. CORP. 
L. 581, 591 (2009) (noting that “[i]n the past, the Court has stressed the need to reduce ‘false positives’ because 
‘mistaken inferences . . . chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect’” (quoting Matsushita 
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986))); Easterbrook, supra note 45, at 2. 
 58. Easterbrook, supra note 45, at 2. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. The separate categories reflect an attempt by the federal judiciary to limit the costs associated with 
expensive litigation. Gladieux, supra note 30, at 472.  
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1. The Per Se Rule  
When a court finds a business practice plainly anticompetitive and without 
redeeming procompetitive virtues, the practice is condemned as per se unlawful.62 If 
a plaintiff can prove that the defendant engaged in the condemned action, the court 
will impose liability “without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have 
caused or the business excuse for their use.”63 Once the plaintiff makes his prima 
facie case, the defendant is precluded from proving that the restraint is reasonable.64 
Business practices receive per se classification only after courts are sufficiently 
familiar with the particular class of restraint to predict with confidence that full 
analysis will condemn it.65 
The per se rule is inappropriate where the challenged practice’s economic impact 
is not immediately obvious.66 The Supreme Court has used Chicago School 
economic models to analyze business practices and replace per se rules with the rule 
of reason.67 Over time, the Court has altered its interpretation of the rule’s scope to 
reflect modern economic thinking.68 In Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons 
Co.,69 the Supreme Court previously held unlawful a manufacturer’s policy to sell its 
products only to distributers agreeing to resell them at predetermined prices.70 For 
nearly a century, the Court interpreted Dr. Miles to impose the per se rule on 
agreements between a manufacturer and retailer that set a minimum price for the 
resale of the manufacturer’s goods, known as vertical71 resale price maintenance.72 
However, in Leegin Creative Leather Products v. PSKS,73 the Supreme Court’s new 
interpretation overturned Dr. Miles, holding that the per se rule does not apply to 
 
 62. N. Pac. R. Co. v. U.S., 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). 
 63. Id. 
 64. HOLMES & MANGIARACINA, supra note 41, § 2:9.  
 65. Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 475 U.S. 322, 344 (1982). 
 66. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 1, 10 (1997) (quoting FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 
477, 458–59 (1986)) (quotation marks omitted). 
 67. John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Economic Authority and the Limits of Expertise in Antitrust Cases, 
90 CORNELL L. REV. 617, 620–21 (2005). For a discussion of the economic price theory underpinning the 
Sherman Act, see PITOFSKY, GOLDSCHMID, & WOOD, TRADE REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS, APP. (6th ed. 
2010). 
 68. See Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 889 (2007) (rejecting application 
of the per se rule to vertical minimum resale price maintenance based on economics literature providing 
procompetitive justifications for the practice). 
 69. 220 U.S. 373 (1911). 
 70. Id. at 408. 
 71. Among other factors, federal courts differentiate business practices based on the relationship between 
firms in the channels of distribution. See, e.g., Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 
717, 730 (1998) (explaining the difference between horizontal and vertical restraints of trade). A horizontal 
restraint occurs between two firms competing at the same level of commerce, i.e. manufacturer-to-
manufacturer or retail-to-retail agreements. Id. A vertical restraint affects firms at different levels of the 
distribution stream, i.e. manufacturer-to-distributor relationships. Id. 
 72. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 887 (citing Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 (1984)). 
 73. 551 U.S. 877 (2007). 
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vertical minimum resale price maintenance.74 The retailer PSKS sued after a leather 
goods and accessories manufacturer, Leegin Leather Products, ceased selling brand 
name products to the plaintiff because the retailer refused to follow Leegin’s 
minimum pricing policies.75 Relying on expert economic analysis, the Court 
acknowledged that the pricing policy’s economic impact was uncertain because it 
had both pro- and anticompetitive justifications.76 In some instances, for example, 
minimum resale price maintenance may give consumers more options by 
stimulating interbrand competition.77 Alternatively, illegal monopolies could use 
resale price maintenance to control price.78 Since both positive and negative 
outcomes were possible, the Court held that per se liability was inappropriate for 
analyzing vertical minimum resale price maintenance agreements.79 
Actions receiving per se condemnation include a variety of agreements between 
competitors.80 For example, horizontal agreements between competitors to fix 
prices, share profits, or divide territory are per se illegal.81 The Court determined 
that these arrangements “reduce[] [the] incentives to compete” and thereby harm 
competition.82 These bright line classifications help to reduce litigation expenses and 
provide certainty for the legality of business practices.83 If the per se rule does not 
apply then, depending on circumstances, a court will apply either the rule of reason 
or “quick look” analysis.84 
2. The Rule of Reason  
Under Sherman Act § 1, the rule of reason is the default standard of review for 
analyzing the legality of a challenged business practice.85 A court will apply the rule 
of reason to every restraint of trade that does not qualify for “quick look” or per se 
treatment.86 To prove that the defendant violated § 1 under this standard, a plaintiff 
 
 74. Id. at 899. 
 75. Id. at 884. 
 76. Id. at 892. 
 77. Id. at 890 (citing Continental T. V. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51–52 (1977)).  
 78. Id. at 892. 
 79. Id. at 899. 
 80. See HOLMES & MANGIARACINA, supra note 41, § 2:9 (identifying practices receiving per se treatment). 
 81. See Citizens Publ’g Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 133–35 (1969) (invalidating competing 
newspapers’ fifty year contract to, inter alia, fix prices and refrain from engaging in competition); HOLMES & 
MANGIARACINA, supra note 41, § 2:9. 
 82. Citizens Publ’g Co., 394 U.S. at 135 (citing Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 328 
(1904)). 
 83. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc., 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982) (noting that the Supreme 
Court has tolerated invalidating some agreements that may otherwise prove reasonable to promote business 
certainty and litigation efficiency). 
 84. See infra notes 85–118 and accompanying text. 
 85. Texaco v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006) (citing State Oil Co. v. Kahn, 522 U.S. 3, 10–19 (1997)) (noting 
that the Court presumptively applies the rule of reason analysis). 
 86. Id. 
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must “demonstrate that a particular contract or combination is in fact unreasonable 
and anticompetitive.”87 As an initial matter, the plaintiff must prove that the 
defendant had market power: the ability to raise prevailing market prices and 
decrease total market output.88 For the court to assess market power, the plaintiff 
must delineate the relevant market.89 A given product or service’s relevant market is 
defined in terms of both available alternatives and geographic region of 
competition.90 With the relevant market delineated, the finder of fact must decide 
whether the questioned practice unreasonably harms competition, taking into 
account a variety of factors.91 
The result is a general inquiry into whether, under all the circumstances, the 
challenged practice “impos[es] an unreasonable restraint on competition.”92 Courts 
differ on the plaintiff’s burden at this stage of the analysis.93 Some courts require 
actual proof of anticompetitive effects, such as above-market prices or decreased 
output, while others require a showing of substantial risk of anticompetitive effects 
in light of the circumstances.94 To determine if a plaintiff met the required standard, 
courts consider the relevant conditions, including: the defendants’ intents and 
purposes, the structure of and competitive conditions within the affected market, 
the relative competitive positions and market power of the defendants, the presence 
of economic or legal barriers inhibiting the ability of actual or potential competitors 
to respond and offset the challenged practice, and apparent justifications for the 
restrictions such as enhanced efficiencies.95 Given the complexities of the inquiry, 
 
 87. Id. The fact-intensive inquiry necessitates presentation of complex economic expert testimony in most 
cases. For a discussion of the factual complexity and economic nature of the issues involved in the presentation 
of economic expert testimony. See Lopatka & Page, supra note 67. 
 88. HOLMES & MANGIARACINA, supra note 41, § 2:10. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (“The true test of legality is whether 
the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is 
such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily 
consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the 
restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, 
the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be 
attained, are all relevant facts. This is not because a good intention will save an otherwise objectionable 
regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict 
consequences.”). 
 92. Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977). 
 93. HOLMES & MANGIARACINA, supra note 41, § 2:10. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See, e.g., State Oil Co. v. Kahn, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) (“[T]he finder of fact must decide whether the 
questioned practice imposes an unreasonable restraint on competition, taking into account a variety of factors, 
including specific information about the relevant business, its condition before and after the restraint was 
imposed, and the restraint’s history, nature, and effect.” (citations omitted)). 
 California ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc. 
512 Journal of Business & Technology Law 
antitrust litigation subject to the rule of reason is a costly endeavor.96 To address 
these concerns, federal courts have developed an intermediate standard of review.97 
3. The Truncated or “Quick Look” Rule of Reason  
In certain circumstances, a court will apply an abbreviated rule of reason.98 The 
truncated rule of reason analysis, or “quick look,” is an intermediate line of 
reasoning, which employs a burden-shifting framework predicated on a 
presumption of illegality.99 Under the truncated rule, “a certain class of restraints . . . 
may require no more than cursory examination to establish that their principal or 
only effect is anticompetitive.”100 Once the plaintiff establishes his prima facie case, 
courts apply a rebuttable presumption of illegality to the challenged constraint.101 
The burden then shifts to the defendant who can rebut the presumption by proving 
the act’s procompetitive nature.102 The truncated rule simplifies the extensive 
market analysis typically required, eliminating the plaintiff’s need to delineate the 
relevant market and show market power.103 
A court applies the truncated rule when “an observer with even a rudimentary 
understanding of economics could conclude that the arrangements in question 
would have an anticompetitive effect on customers and markets.”104 The Supreme 
Court used the truncated approach in NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of 
Oklahoma105 when the University of Oklahoma and the University of Georgia 
challenged the legality of the National Collegiate Athletic Association’s (NCAA) 
television broadcasting plan.106 Essentially, the NCAA limited the total number of 
televised intercollegiate football games that any one team could broadcast.107 The 
Court acknowledged that “by restraining the quantity of television rights available 
for sale, the [NCAA’s plan] create[d] a limitation on output.”108 Although the plan 
likely had anticompetitive effects on the market, limiting output and increasing 
price, the Court considered the NCAA’s procompetitive justifications because 
college athletics, by their very nature, require some restraints on competition.109 
 
 96. Gladieux, supra note 30, at 471–72. 
 97. See infra notes 98–118 and accompanying text. 
 98. HOLMES & MANGIARACINA, supra note 41, § 2:10. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Cal. ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc., 651 F.3d 1118, 1134 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (quoting PHILLIP 
AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1911a, at 295–96 (2d ed. 2005)). 
 101. HOLMES & MANGIARACINA, supra note 41, § 2:10. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999). 
 105. 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
 106. Id. at 88. 
 107. Id. at 94. 
 108. Id. at 99. 
 109. Id. at 101. 
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Inter alia, the NCAA argued that the plan was necessary to protect live attendance 
and maintain a competitive balance among amateur athletics.110 Ultimately, the 
Supreme Court rejected each procompetitive justification, determining that the 
plan restricted output because it prevented schools from responding to consumer 
preference.111 
If, however, an agreement’s anticompetitive effects are not immediately obvious 
and it might plausibly have a net procompetitive effect or possibly no effect at all, 
the “quick look” form of analysis is inappropriate.112 In California Dental Ass’n v. 
FTC,113 the Supreme Court held that truncated analysis was inappropriate for 
analyzing a dental association’s ethics rules that prevented member dentists from 
advertising quality or offering discounts.114 Unlike NCAA v. Board of Regents of the 
University of Oklahoma, the Court could not easily ascertain the advertising 
limitations’ competitive effects.115 The Court reasoned that the rules may enhance 
competition by protecting uniformed customers from deceptive or confusing 
advertising claims.116 As a result, the Court required full development of the record 
to ensure that the impact of the rules was properly understood.117 A defendant, 
however, may avoid the complexities of antitrust litigation if she can convince a 
court that the challenged practice is exempt from review.118 
B. The Nonstatutory Labor Exemption 
In 1935, Congress signed the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which protects 
unionization and employees’ exercise of collective bargaining rights.119 The NLRA 
created the National Labor Relations Board to enforce employee rights, protect 
employees’ right to organize, and obligate employers to bargain collectively with 
unions.120 Because employee collective action could be perceived as an illegal 
restraint of trade, Congress passed legislation establishing that unions do not 
constitute combinations or conspiracies under the Sherman Act.121 Effectively, 
Congress exempted certain union activities from antitrust review.122 
 
 110. Id. at 115, 17. 
 111. Id. at 120. 
 112. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 771 (1999). 
 113. 526 U.S. 756 (1999). 
 114. Id. at 781. 
 115. Id. at 770–71. 
 116. Id. at 771. 
 117. Id. at 778. 
 118. See infra Part II.B. 
 119. In 1937, the Supreme Court upheld the NLRA under the Commerce Clause. National Labor Relations 
Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).  
 120. The 1935 Passage of the Wagner Act, NLRB, http://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/our-history/1935-
passage-wagner-act (last visited Apr. 14, 2013). 
 121. Three sources account for the statutory labor exemption: Section 6 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17, 
Section 20 of the Clayton Act, 29 U.S.C. § 52, and Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuarda Act, 29 U.S.C. § 104. See, 
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Congress, however, failed to expressly exempt employers engaged in the 
collective bargaining process from antitrust scrutiny.123 To fill this gap, the Supreme 
Court read an implicit exemption into the labor exemption statutes to shield some 
potentially competition-suppressing agreements between employers and unions 
engaged in collective bargaining from antitrust review.124 The Supreme Court 
created the exemption because “some restraints on competition imposed through 
the bargaining process must be shielded from antitrust sanctions” to further federal 
labor policy and to promote meaningful collective bargaining.125 Courts have 
applied the nonstatutory labor exemption to promote “good-faith bargaining over 
wages, hours, and working conditions.”126 
Although the boundaries of the nonstatutory labor exemption are unclear, 
courts attempt to protect only those agreements that facilitate a competitive and fair 
bargaining process.127 In Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, International 
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,128 the Supreme Court declined to apply the 
nonstatutory labor exemption to agreements between labor and management 
attempting to monopolize the electrical equipment manufacturing business in New 
York City.129 The Supreme Court’s decision reflected Congress’s intent to prevent 
unions from gaining, “complete and unreviewable authority to aid business groups 
to frustrate [antitrust law’s] primary objective.”130 In addition, the Court declined to 
insulate a wage agreement between mineworkers and large coal companies that the 
Court saw as an attempt to eliminate competition.131 In these decisions, the Court 
 
e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1914) (“The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce. Nothing 
contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor, . . . 
organizations instituted for the purposes of mutual help, and not having capital stock or conducted for profit, 
or to forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate 
objects thereof; nor shall such organizations . . . be held . . . to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in 
restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws.”).  
 122. See 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1914) (exempting labor organization from antitrust scrutiny). 
 123. See Connell Const. Co., Inc. v. Plumbers and Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616, 622 
(1975) (noting that the explicit exemption does not include agreements between unions and nonlabor parties 
(citing Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 662 (1962))). 
 124. Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 236 (1996) (citations omitted). 
 125. Id. at 237 (citing Connell, 421 U.S. at 622; Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 711 (1965); 
Pennington, 381 U.S. at 665 (parentheticals omitted)); see also The Supreme Court —Leading Cases, 110 HARV. L. 
REV. 327, 327 (1996) (“Courts have long struggled to reconcile the federal antitrust laws, which prohibit 
anticompetitive combinations, with the federal labor laws, which encourage the formation of unions, 
multiemployer bargaining groups, and other competition-reducing collaborations.”). 
 126. Brown, 518 U.S. at 236 (citations omitted). 
 127. See Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 131 (2d Cir. 2004) (noting that although the 
Supreme Court has never delineated the precise boundaries of the exemption, the Court’s guidance has come 
from cases where the employer and union attempted to eliminate a competitor from the market). 
 128. 325 U.S. 797 (1945). 
 129. Id. at 809. 
 130. Id. at 810. 
 131. United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 665–66 (1965). 
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refused to protect collective bargaining agreements that failed to embody good-faith 
bargaining efforts.132 
Despite hesitation by lower courts,133 the Supreme Court broadened the 
nonstatutory labor exemption to include agreements solely between employers.134 In 
Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., the Supreme Court insulated the National Football 
League’s (NFL) unilateral implementation of the developmental squad program 
despite resistance from the National Football League Players Association.135 The 
Court relied on five factors to resolve the issue: (1) whether the action “grew out of, 
and was directly related to” the collective bargaining process, (2) whether the 
practice was “unobjectionable as a matter of labor law and policy,” (3) whether it 
concerned only parties to the collective bargaining relationship, (4) whether the 
conduct involved subject matter that the parties were required to negotiate 
collectively, and (5) whether the conduct “took place during and immediately after 
a collective-bargaining negotiation.”136 In holding that the nonstatutory labor 
exemption applied, the Court emphasized that, for the exemption to be effective, it 
must apply to both the completed agreement and the bargaining process.137 
Moreover, the Court stressed that some restraints on competition were necessary to 
protect meaningful collective bargaining.138 By expanding the nonstatutory labor 
exemption in Brown, the Court showed a willingness to exempt employer-only 
agreements provided they facilitate a competitive and healthy bargaining process.139 
III. The Court’s Reasoning 
In California ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc., the Ninth Circuit narrowly construed the 
nonstatutory labor exemption, holding that the RSP was not exempt from antitrust 
scrutiny.140 The court strictly interpreted Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., reasoning that, 
under the totality of the circumstances, the logic and history of the exemption 
counseled against applying the nonstatutory labor exemption to the grocers’ RSP.141 
 
 132. See supra notes 128–31 and accompanying text. 
 133. See PHILLIP AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 257b2, at 141 (3d ed. 2006) (noting 
that the courts have been historically reluctant to extend the exemption to an agreement between employers 
that did not include an employee group). 
 134. Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 250 (1996). 
 135. The NFL sought to create developmental squads, whose players would be paid $1000 per week. Id. at 
234. The developmental squad players filed suit arguing the NFL had made an agreement in restraint of trade 
violating § 1 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 235. 
 136. Id. at 238, 250. 
 137. See id. at 243 (“One cannot mean the principle literally—that the exemption applies only to 
understandings embodied in a collective-bargaining agreement—for the collective-bargaining process may take 
place before the making of any agreement or after an agreement has expired.”).  
 138. Id. at 237 (citations omitted). 
 139. See supra notes 133–38 and accompanying text. 
 140. Cal. ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc., 651 F.3d 1118, 1129 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 141. Id. 
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First, the Ninth Circuit contrasted the unilateral imposition of terms by the NFL 
in Brown with the MEBU’s use of the RSP.142 The court noted that the former was an 
accepted and extensively regulated practice in labor negotiation, whereas in the 
present case the defendants’ actions lacked the necessary history or endorsement 
from labor law and policy.143 Since the parties were unable to identify regulatory or 
judicial decisions that sanctioned the use of a RSP as an economic weapon during a 
labor dispute, the court reasoned that the RSP was “on different footing” than the 
agreement in Brown.144 
The court then concluded that the concerns “central to the history and logic of 
the exemption” underlying Brown were not present.145 The court reasoned that the 
RSP was neither significant nor necessary to the collective bargaining process 
because it did not relate to any core subject matter of bargaining.146 According to the 
court, the defendants’ assertion of the RSP’s relative value and purpose as an 
economic weapon over a core bargaining subject was insufficient to merit the 
implicit exemption’s application.147 The court went further, arguing that exempting 
the RSP would allow multiemployer bargaining units to fix prices while claiming it 
was simply an economic bargaining tool.148 The court, however, did not read Brown 
to expand the nonstatutory exemption so broadly.149 
To support its decision, the court maintained that failure to expand the 
nonstatutory labor exemption would not “introduce instability and uncertainty 
into the collective bargaining process.”150 According to the Ninth Circuit, the fear of 
antitrust liability would not hinder the functioning of the collective bargaining 
process.151 Furthermore, the RSP did not concern the labor market.152 Since the RSP 
only concerned the “business market,” the case for exemption applicability was not 
strong.153 The court argued that the grocers’ profit-sharing was not directly 
consequential to the labor market.154 
 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id.  
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 1129–30. 
 146. The core subject matter of bargaining includes wages, hours, and working conditions. Id. at 1130. 
 147. Id.  
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. (quoting Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 242(1996)). 
 151. Id.  
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. (“The case for the applicability of the non-statutory exemption is strongest where the alleged 
restraint operates primarily in the labor market and has only tangential effects on the business market.” 
(quoting Am. Steel Erectors, Inc. v. Local Union No. 7. Int’l Ass’n of Bridge, Structural, Ornamental & 
Reinforcing Iron Workers, 536 F.3d 68, 79 (1st Cir. 2008))). 
 154. Harris, 651 F.3d at 1131. The court stopped short of “endorsing the concept that as a strict rule the 
non-statutory labor exemption can only arise in a case involving restraint of terms directly relating to labor.” Id. 
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Finally, the court reasoned that the MEBU’s inclusion of a nonmember in the 
revenue sharing scheme “counsel[ed] against application of the exemption.”155 
Because the actions in Brown concerned only parties to the collective bargaining 
process, the court was uncomfortable stretching the nonstatutory labor exemption 
to an agreement including nonmembers.156 The inclusion of Food 4 Less, a 
nonbargaining grocer, was evidence that the defendants’ actions were not tethered 
to the collective bargaining process.157 The defendants failed to convince the court 
that the nonmember’s inclusion in the RSP was necessary because Food 4 Less’s 
future negotiations depended on the current dispute’s outcome.158 Thus, the court 
held that the nonstatutory labor exemption did not apply.159 
In dissent, Chief Judge Kozinski criticized the majority’s decision as beyond the 
scope of the court’s Article III jurisdiction.160 Since no antitrust liability could be 
established, Chief Judge Kozinski maintained, the court’s ruling on the 
nonstatutory labor exemption was unnecessary.161 The Chief Judge argued that 
California’s stipulated dismissal upon a finding that rule of reason applies made it 
unlikely that the defendant would appeal the decision.162 Thus, the court had 
effectively insulated the ruling from appellate scrutiny.163 
Moreover, the Chief Judge argued that the majority incorrectly decided the issue 
by failing to grapple with the complexities of the case.164 Chief Judge Kozinski 
contended that every factor the Supreme Court found relevant in Brown supported 
finding the RSP protected by the labor exemption.165 The dissent argued the first 
factor was satisfied; the RSP was inextricably intertwined with the collective 
bargaining process.166 Moreover, the Supreme Court and NLRB have generally 
sanctioned the use of economic weapons to combat whipsaw tactics.167 Thus, the 
RSP met the second Brown factor: the conduct was “unobjectionable as a matter of 
labor law and policy.”168 Third, the RSP concerned only parties with a direct stake in 
the outcome of the dispute.169 Because Food 4 Less was bound to negotiate with the 
 
 155. Id.  
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id.  
 159. Id. at 1132. 
 160. Id. at 1140 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (citing Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 220 F.3d 
1134, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)). 
 161. Id.  
 162. Id. 
 163. Id.  
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. See id. (“The grocers’ agreement was a direct response to the union’s anticipated use of whipsaw 
tactics.”). 
 167. Id. at 1141 (citing NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278 (1965)).  
 168. Id. (quoting Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 238 (1996)). 
 169. Id. at 1142 (citing Brown, 518 U.S. at 250). 
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union, it had a strong interest in the current negotiations.170 The fourth Brown 
factor — whether the conduct involved subject matter that the parties were 
required to negotiate collectively — did not apply because the RSP was procedural, 
not substantive, in nature, the dissent argued.171 Finally, the conduct took place 
during and immediately after the collective bargaining negotiations because of the 
RSP’s inherently limited duration.172 Thus, the MEBU’s actions met the Brown 
standard for application of the nonstatutory labor exemption.173 
On the issue of the appropriate antitrust standard of review, however, the 
majority pivoted its approach, holding that rule of reason analysis applied to the 
RSP.174 The court rejected California’s argument that the RSP should be per se illegal 
as either a profit-pooling agreement or a market-allocation agreement.175 The court 
distinguished the RSP from a profit-pooling agreement based on the RSP’s short-
term, temporary nature.176 Furthermore, since the RSP excluded some grocers 
operating in the region, it did not constitute a profit-pooling arrangement.177 
Finally, the court argued that the RSP was also not an illegal market-allocation 
agreement because it did not prevent any defendant from making sales, stop grocers 
from selling any particular products, or limit the grocers to a particular set of 
customers or geographic regions.178 Given these factors, the court reasoned that the 
RSP did not “facially appear[] to be one that would always or almost always tend to 
restrict competition and decrease output,” making application of the per se rule 
inappropriate.179 
The court also rejected the application of “quick look” analysis because the RSP’s 
characteristics made its anticompetitive effects uncertain.180 The RSP’s limited 
duration and significant external competition in the market made it impossible for 
the court to determine the RSP’s true economic impact on a “quick look.”181 The 
court argued that a full record must be developed to understand the actual RSP’s 
 
 170. Id. Food 4 Less was required to pay employee benefits at a rate tied to that of Ralphs. Id. 
 171. Id. at 1143. 
 172. Id. (quoting Brown, 518 U.S. at 250) 
 173. Id. In a separate dissent, Judge Reinhardt, who authored the original Ninth Circuit decision, argued 
that under “quick look” analysis, the RSP should have been found to violate § 1 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 
1144–45 (Reinhart, J., dissenting). 
 174. Id. at 1139 (majority opinion). 
 175. Id. at 1134. 
 176. See id. at 1136 (citing Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969)) (noting that 
because only some competitors in the relevant market were a party to the agreement, and because the RSP was 
of limited duration, the challenged constraint does not fit any “easy label” that can be considered a per se 
violation of the Sherman Act). 
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 178. Id. at 1137. 
 179. Id. (quoting Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1979)). 
 180. Id. 
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economic impact.182 The unique features strongly suggested that the agreement 
“might plausibly be thought to have a net procompetitive effect, or possibly no 
effect at all on competition.”183 Given the inapplicability of the per se rule and 
truncated rule of reason, the presumptive rule of reason was the appropriate 
standard of review.184 
IV. Analysis 
In California ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc., the Ninth Circuit declined to apply the 
nonstatutory labor exemption to the challenged RSP; consequently, multiemployer 
bargaining units face antitrust liability if they employ a temporary revenue sharing 
provision to counter union whipsaw tactics.185 In addition, the court’s narrow 
holding attached the rule of reason standard of review to temporary revenue 
sharing provisions.186 The decision reflects federal courts’ continued shift from 
formalistic line drawing to the rule of reason for assessing antitrust claims.187 
Although the court correctly linked the rule of reason to the complex economic 
nature of the challenged constraint, it unnecessarily limited the nonstatutory labor 
exemption’s scope.188 The court’s restrictive reading grants unions a competitive 
advantage during collective bargaining, undermining the federal government’s 
policy to encourage fair negotiations.189 The Supreme Court should overturn the 
Ninth Circuit and shield temporary revenue sharing provisions between 
multiemployer bargaining units to further federal labor law’s policy promoting 
equitable labor relations.190 
A. The Ninth Circuit’s Application of the Rule of Reason Continues the Federal Courts’ 
Jurisprudential Shift Away from Formalistic Line Drawing, Protecting Complex 
Business Practices from Premature Condemnation Under the Sherman Act 
In California ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc., the Ninth Circuit properly rejected 
summary condemnation of the defendants’ RSP through either “quick look” or per 
se analysis.191 The court’s adherence to the rule of reason continues federal courts’ 
 
 182. See id. (“One might want to have an understanding of the market impact of other competitors . . . an 
understanding whether other competitors were waiting in the wings to exploit any anticompetitive market by 
their entry . . . .”). 
 183. Id. at 1138 (citing Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 771 (1999)). 
 184. Id. at 1139.  
 185. Id. at 1134–35. 
 186. Id. at 1139.  
 187. See infra, Part V.A. 
 188. See infra, Part V.B. 
 189. See infra, Part V.B. 
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 191. 651 F.3d at 1139. 
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emphasis on minimizing the use of bright line standards in antitrust litigation.192 In 
future antitrust challenges to complex bargaining tactics, applying the rule of reason 
standard will help further the federal antitrust policy of condemning only 
unreasonable restraints of trade, promoting the efficient allocation of resources, and 
avoiding false positives.193 
The court properly ruled on the issue of whether the per se or “quick look” rules 
applied to the RSP because it placed the provision in the appropriate context.194 The 
unique circumstances surrounding the RSP — its limited duration and the 
existence of other competitors in the market — suggest that a court cannot 
determine the agreement to be “anticompetitive on its face.”195 In other words, 
internal and external factors minimize the risk of anticompetitive effects.196 With 
other competitors in the market, appropriate incentives remained to prevent the 
firms from taking anticompetitive action.197 In addition, given the agreement’s 
temporary nature, the individual firms within the MEBU are motivated to keep 
prices at competitive levels during and after collective bargaining.198 As a result, the 
internal and external competition would mitigate the MEBU’s ability to raise prices 
or reduce output, preventing anticompetitive outcomes.199 
Since the Supreme Court has stressed the need to avoid false positives and 
embraced economic modeling to analyze challenged practices, defaulting to the rule 
of reason is necessary to ensure that trial courts effectuate those policies.200 Full 
development of the record through rule of reason analysis will reduce the 
occurrence of false positives.201 By avoiding formalistic rules, federal courts can 
adequately assess the actual competitive effect of a challenged business practice.202 In 
turn, fewer beneficial practices will be condemned.203 In the instant case, the RSP’s 
 
 192. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (holding that rule of reason 
analysis applies to vertical agreements to fix minimum resale prices); Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 
U.S. 36 (1977) (overruling the per se illegality of vertical territorial restraints in favor of the rule of reason). 
 193. See infra notes 200–08 and accompanying text. 
 194. See Neal R. Stoll & Shepard Goldfein, Danger of Rudimentary Economics: ‘Safeway’ Competitive Effects 
Analysis, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 9, 2011, available at http://www.skadden.com/sites/default/files/publications/ 
Publications2498_0.pdf (noting that judges’ risk presuming that a practice is anticompetitive when they fail to 
analyze the context of the restraint). 
 195. See id. (criticizing Judge Reinhardt’s dissenting opinion for failing to consider critical aspects of the 
RSP, including its effects and temporal limitation). 
 196. Id. 
 197. Cal. ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc., 651 F.3d 1118, 1136 (9th Cir. 2011).  
 198. See Stoll & Goldfein, supra note 194 (“The temporal limitation, however, is critical to the entire inquiry 
as it discourages the parties from functioning as a cartel.”). 
 199. See Stoll & Goldfein, supra note 194.  
 200. See Bernard, supra note 57, at 591. 
 201. See Stoll & Goldfein, supra note 194. 
 202. See Stoll & Goldfein, supra note 194. 
 203. See Stoll & Goldfein, supra note 194. 
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unique circumstances indicate a plausibility of neutral or procompetitive effects.204 
If the RSP allowed the grocers to withstand union pressure, preventing above-
market labor costs, consumers would benefit from the corresponding lower 
prices.205 Without all the facts on the record, the court could not adequately assess 
the RSP’s impact.206 Since the RSP’s economic impact is uncertain, imposing 
liability based on a limited record would increase the risk of “mistaken inferences” 
by the judge.207 Instead, by applying rule of reason analysis, litigants can establish an 
appropriate foundation, allowing courts to fully comprehend the challenged 
agreement’s impact on consumer welfare.208 
B. The Ninth Circuit’s Improper Application of the Brown Factors to the Grocers’ RSP 
Unnecessarily Limits the Scope of the Nonstatutory Labor Exemption, Giving Unions a 
Competitive Advantage During Collective Bargaining 
Though the Ninth Circuit correctly held that the rule of reason applies to the RSP, 
the court misapplied the Brown factors and consequently failed to insulate the RSP 
from antitrust scrutiny.209 As a result, the decision unnecessarily limits the scope of 
the nonstatutory labor exemption and gives unions a competitive advantage during 
collective bargaining.210 The threat of antitrust liability will discourage employers 
from using revenue sharing provisions during labor negotiations.211 Alternatively, 
the nonstatutory labor exemption, if applied, would further equitable collective 
bargaining by protecting the integrity of multiemployer bargaining units.212 
The Ninth Circuit errantly constrained the nonstatutory labor exemption by 
misapplying the Supreme Court precedent in Brown.213 The Brown factors and the 
decision’s underlying concerns are satisfied by the defendants’ RSP.214 First, the 
provision was “inextricably intertwined with the collective bargaining process.”215 
The RSP, lasting for a limited period, was intended to mitigate the union’s whipsaw 
 
 204. Cal. ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc., 651 F.3d 1118, 1138 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Cal. Dental Ass’n v. 
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 208. See supra notes 92–95 and accompanying text. 
 209. Harris, 651 F.3d at 1140 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).  
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 211. Id. at 1144. 
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tactic.216 The provision, therefore, was directly related to the negotiations.217 Second, 
both the Supreme Court and National Labor Relations Board have previously 
sanctioned the use of economic weapons to combat whipsaw tactics.218 Since the 
RSP was designed to maintain group cohesion during collective bargaining, it 
promoted healthy negotiations.219 Thus, the RSP provided balance and was 
“unobjectionable as a matter of labor law and policy.”220 Third, the RSP concerned 
only parties with a direct stake in the outcome of the collective bargaining 
agreement.221 Although Food 4 Less had a separate union contract, its agreement 
expired the following month.222 As a practical matter, the current dispute’s outcome 
would determine the nonmember’s new contract terms.223 The fourth Brown factor 
— whether the conduct involved subject matter that the parties were required to 
negotiate collectively — was irrelevant.224 In Harris, unlike in Brown, the challenged 
practice was a procedural bargaining tactic rather than a substantive contract 
term.225 Therefore, asking whether the practice related to “wages, hours, and 
working conditions” is unnecessary.226 Finally, the conduct occurred during and 
immediately after negotiations due to the RSP’s temporal limitation.227 Thus, the 
majority rested its decision on an improper application of the Brown factors, 
undermining federal labor policy.228 
As a matter of policy, the federal judiciary should expand the nonstatutory labor 
exemption to include temporary revenue sharing provisions designed to maintain 
group cohesion during labor disputes.229 Liberal application of the exemption would 
protect balanced negotiations between employer and union during collective 
bargaining.230 Without the implicit exemption, the court limits a bargaining unit’s 
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 218. Id. at 1141 (citing NLRB v. Brown, 38 U.S. 278 (1965)). 
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 220. Brown, 518 U.S. at 238. 
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 228. See supra text accompanying notes 215–27. 
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ability to effectively combat whipsaw tactics.231 Selective picketing erodes group 
unity because of the targeted financial pressure.232 The lone firm’s incentives change 
as pressure to settle or leave the group increases.233 Because a multiemployer 
bargaining unit’s temporary revenue sharing provision is not insulated from 
antitrust scrutiny, the potential liability increases the employers’ costs of combating 
whipsaw tactics.234 Since the threat of antitrust liability remains, the Ninth Circuit 
has created an imbalance of power favoring labor unions.235 
The competitive imbalance will encourage unions to increase use of whipsaw 
tactics and threaten antitrust litigation, possibly affecting the outcome of 
negotiations and reducing equitable collective bargaining.236 The court’s holding 
increases labor costs, placing pressure on employers’ profit margins, and ultimately 
raises prices for consumers.237 Maintaining a balance of power during collective 
bargaining, however, would promote meaningful negotiations between employer 
and union and ensure that fair labor contracts are produced.238 To do otherwise 
would undermine the “national policy . . . of promoting ‘the peaceful settlement of 
industrial disputes by subjecting labor-management controversies to the mediatory 
influence of negotiation.’”239 
Conclusion 
In California ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc., the Ninth Circuit’s decision mismanages 
the intersection of antitrust and labor law.240 Although, the decision correctly 
followed federal courts’ preference for avoiding false positives over economical 
litigation, the nonstatutory labor exemption provided a superior path for resolving 
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the dispute.241 The Harris court’s narrow interpretation of the nonstatutory labor 
exemption created an imbalance of power between employer and union.242 Failure 
to insulate efficiency-increasing negotiation practices will undermine equitable 
negotiations, raising costs for consumers.243 Because of the case’s small likelihood of 
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